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The Perversion of the Historic Function of the
Grand Jury in Minnesota
Robert M. Paule*
L Introduction
Historically perceived as an independent body shielding the
citizenry from unfounded and malicious prosecutions,' the grand
jury has instead become a sword in the hands of the prosecution.
Today, the grand jury is one of the most powerful weapons in the
prosecutor's vast arsenal. The grand jury is also an instrument
vulnerable to prosecutorial abuse without being subject to mean-
ingful judicial oversight.2 This transformation from a means of ex-
oneration into a prosecutorial tool has drawn not only harsh
criticism and cries for reform, but also comparisons with such no-
torious institutions as the Star Chamber 3 and the Ku Klux Klan.4
In modern grand jury practice, the prosecutor controls the
proceedings from beginning to end. She decides what and who to
investigate, who to subpoena, what to develop in the course of the
* J.D. 1989, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. 1985, Gustavus Adolphus
College. I would like to express my appreciation to Lisa McNaughton for her inval-
uable insights and editorial assistance.
1. Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the
innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive persecution; it serves
the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser
and the accused ... to determine whether a charge is founded upon
reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice or per-
sonal ill will.
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1961). See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 521 (1883); Ex Parte Bain, 113 U.S. 1, 11 (1886); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59
(1905). See generally Note, The Grand Jury As An Investigatory Body, 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 590 (1961).
2. See Note, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, The Trial Judge, And
Undue Influence, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (1972).
3. "[A] dangerous modern form of star chamber secret inquisition that is tram-
pling the rights of American citizens from coast to coast." Grand Jury Venue-
Northern District of Texas: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citi-
zenship, and International Law of the House Comm on Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1973) (testimony of Senator Edward M. Kennedy).
4. "The grand jury functions too much like the Ku Klux Klan. It is shrouded
in too much secrecy and only one side is heard. This is incompatible with sound
justice." Wayne Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 Or. L. Rev. 101,
350-51 n.207 (1931).
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questioning, who to indict, and how to draft the indictment itself.5
Under the watchful eye of the prosecutor, the grand jury may
summon any person before it, subject to very few limitations, and
force him to disclose any information which he possesses regarding
the matter of inquiry. The prosecutor remains with the grand jury
throughout the proceedings, except deliberations and voting,6 and
controls the entire process from start to finish.
This article will examine the role of the modern grand jury
in Minnesota and contrast it with the historical function of the in-
stitution. The article will trace the origin and function of the
grand jury and follow it as it evolved in England and crossed the
Atlantic with the colonists, eventually becoming part of the crimi-
nal process in every state. The article will then examine in detail
the role of the grand jury in Minnesota and contrast it with the
historical function of the body. The final section will analyze the
main criticisms of the grand jury.
II. History
A. English History
The origin and early history of the grand jury is shrouded in
obscurity. The inception of the grand jury, if such a distinct event
ever actually occurred, has long since blurred with the passage of
time. A number of similar institutions existed throughout Europe
during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. France,7 Germany,8
Norway, 9 Sweden,lO Denmark," and even England12 itself mani-
fested progenitors of the grand jury during these so-called Dark
5. See, e.g., Marvin Frankel & Gary Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution
on Trial (1977).
6. See Minn. Stat. § 628.63 (1988); Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.04 (1988).
7. See James Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common
Law 104 (1906); Morse, supra note 4, at 103; Note, The Grand Jury: Its Evolution
and Alternatives, A National Survey, 3 Criminology Just. Q. 114, 115-16 (1975).
8. See Morse, supra note 4, at 105 ("The mistake must be guarded against, of
confusing the jurymen with the doomsmen ... used in the older modes of trial
which prevailed in the old Germanic and Anglo-Saxon Courts."); see also Edward
Jenks, A Short History of English Law 47 (1912) (although possibly acting on an
oath, the doomsmen were a tribunal, not a method of trial).
9. See William Forsyth, Trial By Jury 16-18 (1875). In Norway there were pe-
riodic meetings at which three persons, authorized by the Crown, nominated a cer-
tain number of deputies from each district. Thirty-six of the deputies were chosen
to act as jurors. These jurors, called laugrettomen, acted not as jurymen, as the
term is typically understood, but rather as judges. Id.
10. A Nambd, an institution similar to Norway's laugrettomen, existed in Swe-
den. Forsyth, supra note 9, at 19-20; Morse, supra note 4, at 106.
11. See Morse, supra note 4, at 106 (In Denmark, jury-like bodies called Naeuns
and Sandemaends developed about 750-790 A.D.).
12. Id. at 104 ("It is possible that in England before the Norman Conquest, the
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Ages. Legal historians themselves are unable to agree as to the be-
ginnings of the grand jury.13
Most commentators agree, however, that a precursor of the
grand jury was introduced into England by the Normans following
the conquest.14 The Normans originally used this institution as a
means of gathering information. The records from this period indi-
cate the use of a body of "neighbors" summoned by the local sher-
iff and brought before public officials to answer questions under
oath.15
During the reign of Henry II, the use of the grand jury was
greatly expanded.' 6 Henry II made great use of the periodic As-
seeds of a jury system had been planted, in that the church courts may have been
applying an inquisatory procedure .... "); see also Note, supra note 7, at 115.
13. See generally Leroy Clark, The Grand Jury: The Use and Abuse of Political
Power (1976); Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 5; 1 William Holdsworth, A History
of English Law (7th ed. 1956); Edward Jenks, A Short History of English Law
(1912); Wayne LaFave & Jerold Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984); 1 John Reeves,
History of English Law (1916); Thayer, supra note 7; Michael Deusch, Politicul Ac-
tivists and the Grand Jury, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1159 (1984); Morse supra
note 4; James Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Admimis-
trative Agency of the Prosecutor?, 2 N.M. L. Rev. 141 (1972); Helen Schwartz,
Demythologyzing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 701
(1972).
14. "When Edward the Confessor died in 1066, he left no direct heir to the
throne of England." The English nobles bestowed the Crown upon Harold Godwin-
son, the Earl of Wessex. However, two foreign kings, Harold of Norway and Wil-
liam of Normandy, also claimed the Crown by right of birth..
Harold Godwinson, fearing an invasion by William from across the English
Channel, positioned the majority of his forces in the south of England. Meanwhile,
King Harold of Norway invaded to the north with his Viking fleet. Harold Godwin-
son rushed his army north and engaged the Viking force in York. This caught the
Norwegians by surprise, and the English persevered.
On the heels of this victory, Harold Godwinson received news that William had
crossed the English Channel. Harold Godwinson marched his weary troops south
and confronted the Normans at Hastings. This move played right into the hands of
William, whose small army could not withstand a lengthy campaign, giving him an
opportunity to land a crushing blow on the English. During the course of the bat-
tle, Harold Godwinson was fatally struck in his left eye by an archer's arrow, and
the Normans went on to rout the English army, establishing William the Con-
queror as the undisputed King of England. David Wallechinsky & Irving Wallace,
The Peoples Alamanac 617 (1975). See generally George Keeton, The Norman Con-
quest and the Common Law (1966).
See LaFave & Israel, supra note 13, § 8.2(a); Walton Coates, The Grand Jury,
The Prosecutor's Puppe4 Wasteful Nonsense of Criminal Jurisprudence, 33 Pa.
B.A.Q. 311 (1962) (Norman conquests may have introduced it); see also State v. Fal-
cone, 292 Minn. 365, 195 N.W.2d 572 (1972) (grand jury introduced into England by
the Normans); Holdsworth, supra note 13, at 313.
15. See Falcone, 292 Minn. at 367, 195 N.W.2d at 574; Morse, supra note 4, at
106: Note, supra note 7, at 116; see also Richard Alexander & Sheldon Portman,
Grand Jury Indictment Versus Prosecution by Information-An Equal Protec-
tion--Due Process Issue, 25 Hast. L.J. 997, 998 (1974).
16. See Falcone, 292 Minn. at 367, 195 N.W.2d at 574; Morse, supra note 4, at
107; see also Note, supra note 7, at 116-17.
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sizes17 (courts) to centralize royal power, and the grand jury be-
came a prominent tool in his effort to wrest control of the
judiciary away from the feudal and ecclesiastial courts, which were
very powerful during this period. This is perhaps why the grand
jury is commonly perceived as originating from the Assize of Clar-
endon,18 in which groups of laymen were summoned by the Crown
and charged with the responsibility of investigating crime.19 The
grand jury was further entrenched into the English legal process
as part of the Magna Carta,20 passed in 1215.
By the end of the fourteenth century, England had replaced
the methods of trial by ordeal21 and trial by battle22 with trial by
jury. The original grand jury separated into two distinct bodies.23
The accusatory (grand) jury was expanded into a twenty-four
member body that was reduced to twenty-three members in
1368,24 and the guilt phase of trial was held before a jury of twelve.
The accusatory body gradually became known as "Le Grande In-
queste," which provides a logical explanation for the modern title
of grand jury.25 By the seventeenth century, the grand jury began
to more closely resemble the modern institution.28
As it evolved in England, the historic function of the grand
jury was to stand as an independent bulwark protecting the citi-
zenry from unfounded accusations from the Crown.27 To this end,
17. In later English law, the name "Assizes" was given to the court, time, or
place where the Judges of Assize ... who were sent by special commission from the
Crown on circuits throughout the Kingdom. Black's Law Dictionary 111 (5th ed.
1977).
18. Issued in 1166. LaFave & Israel, supra note 13, § 8.2(a).
19. See Holdsworth, supra note 13, at 77; William Campbell, Eliminate the
Grand Jury, 64 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 174, 175 (1973); Morse, supra note 4, at
112.
20. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 19, at 175.
21. This marvelous piece of trial ingenuity worked like this: The person
who underwent the ordeal appealed to God to prove his innocence by
protecting him from harm; at least, he customarily did, though such
appeal was by no means obligatory. The trick was then to plunge
one's arm to the elbow in boiling water. Small wonder there were few
acquittals; even so, the hand was lost in any event.
Theodore Kranitz, The Grand Jury: Past-Present-No Future, 24 Mo. L. Rev. 318,
319 (1959). See also Holdsworth, supra note 13, at 310.
22. The trial by battle was an appeal to providence in the hope that heaven
would give victory to the innocent or injured party. See William Blackstone, Com-
mentaries *337-41.
23. LaFave & Israel, supra note 13, § 8.2(a); see also State v. Falcone, 292 Minn.
365, 367, 195 N.W.2d 572, 575 (1972); Holdsworth, supra note 13, at 325.
24. See Shannon, supra note 14, at 143.
25. LaFave & Israel, supra note 13, § 8.2(a); see also Falcone, 292 Minn. at 367,
195 N.W.2d at 575.
26. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 710-11.
27. See supra note 1.
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the grand jury began to receive testimony in secret to protect both
witnesses and jurors from being unfairly influenced by the
Crown,28 and to "guard the people against the oppressive power of
autocratic government."29 The Colledge 30 and Shqftesbury 31 cases
greatly enhanced the image of the grand jury as the guardian of
the individual from malicious prosecutions. In both cases, grand
juries refused to return indictments against Anglican opponents of
the King.32 These two cases provide an excellent illustration of
the traditional independence of the grand jury. The Crown even-
tually executed Colledge and Shaftesbury. The grand juries, how-
ever, refused to compromise their independent roles, thereby
forcing the Crown to use underhanded tactics to achieve its goal.33
These cases came to symbolize the perception of the English grand
jury as the watchdog of the citizens against an overzealous
government.
B. American History
When the colonists crossed the Atlantic to America, they
brought with them a legal system predominantly based on the
British system of jurisprudence, including the grand jury.34 Grand
juries were established in the various colonies almost immedi-
28. LaFave & Israel, supra note 13, § 8.2(a); see also In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564,
568 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
29. In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. at 569.
30. 8 How. St. Tr. 549 (1681).
31. 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681).
32. In each case, the Royal prosecutor presented evidence of treason to separate
grand juries against the Earl of Shaftesbury and Stephen Colledge. In both cases,
the grand jury returned bills marked ignoramus, rejecting the accusations put forth
by the Crown. In Colledge's case, the grand jury foreman was sent to the Tower
and later forced into exile. A subsequent grand jury did return an indictment
against Colledge, who was then tried, convicted and executed.
Three months after Colledge's execution, the case against Shaftesbury was
presented to a London grand jury, which again refused to indict. When a third
grand jury was summoned to hear the case against him, Shaftesbury fled from Eng-
land. See LaFave & Israel, supra note 13, § 8.2(a); Schwartz, supra note 13, at 710-
21.
33. See LaFave & Israel, supra note 13, § 8.2(a). In Shaftesbury's first grand
jury hearing, the Chief Justice of the London Bench (loyal to the King) instructed
the grand jury in a most biased manner, threatening them with criminal sanctions
if they failed to indict. Further, he discarded the traditional secrecy of the proceed-
ings. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 710-21. "Now let me tell you, if any of you shall
be refractory, and will not find any bill, where there is probable ground for an ac-
cusation, you do therein undertake to intercept justice: and you thereby make your-
selves criminals and guilty .... " Id. at 717.
34. "The grand jury is an integral part of our constitutional heritage which was
brought to this coutnry with the common law." Deborah Emerson, Grand Jury Re-
form, A Review of Key Issues 1 (1983) (quoting United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564, 571 (1976)).
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ately:35 Massachusetts Bay in 1634-1635,36 Plymouth in 1635-36,37
Maryland in 1637,38 Rhode Island in 1640,39 Virginia in 1641,40
Connecticut in 1643, 41 Pennsylvania in 1683,42 and New Jersey in
1675.43 The grand jury quickly became the primary vehicle for the
colonists to voice their grievances against the British," due to its
independence from direct royal control.
As the oppostition to the British became more overt, grand
juries became more sympathetic to the colonists and less respon-
sive to the desires of the Loyalists'45 gaining a degree of indepen-
dence frowned upon by the British.46 The famous case of
newspaper publisher John Peter Zenger is a prime example: His
colonial paper vigorously opposed the British presence, specifically
designating the New York Colonial Governor as a primary recipi-
ent of criticism. Two separate New York grand juries refused to
indict him for criminal libel.4 7 Further, in 1765, a Boston grand
jury refused to find an indictment against the leaders of the Stamp
Act Riots.48
As the American Revolution began, the colonial grand juries
began to assert themselves even more forcefully. They issued in-
dictments against British sympathizers. 49 Moreover, those accused
of siding with the British were prohibited from sitting on grand
juries.50
35. By 1683, all of the colonies had implemented the grand jury in some form.
Id. at 10.
36. Richard Younger, The People's Panel: The Grand Jury in the United States,
1634-1941, at 6 (1963).
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Id.
40. James Whyte, Is The Grand Jury Necessary ?, 45 Va. L. Rev. 461, 461-66
(1959).
41. Younger, supra note 36, at 8.
42. Id. at 15.
43. Id. at 13.
44. See generally Clark, supra note 13, at 7-9.
45. See Emerson, supra note 34, at 10.
46. The English grand jury had occasionally used its power of present-
ment to criticize action or inaction of government officials that fell
short of criminal misconduct. The American grand juries made exten-
sive use of that authority, and their presentment "reports" became the
primary vehicle for the expression of the complaints of the citizenry
on a wide range of matters.
LaFave & Israel, supra note 13, § 8.2(b).
47. Ultimately, Zenger was charged by complaint with libel and was acquitted.
Many attribute this acquittal to the heroic efforts of his lawyer, Alexander Hamil-
ton. See Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 13, at 108.
48. See id.; see also, Note, supra note 7, at 121.
49. See Clark, supra note 13, at 17.
50. Id.
THE GRAND JURY IN MINNESOTA
Largely as a result of its popular opposition to the British, the
grand jury emerged from the American Revolution with new-
found power and greatly enhanced prestige. The framers of the
Constitution perceived the function of the grand jury as so essen-
tial to liberty that they specifically provided for it in the Constitu-
tion: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury.... ."51 Most states also required that all felony prosecutions
be instigated either by indictment or by presentment.52
During the infancy of the nation, the grand jury occasionally
fell prey to partisanship, manipulated by whichever political party
was in power at the particular time.53 The Sedition Act54 cases re-
flect this pattern of manipulation. The passage of the Act provided
an opportunity for president John Adams to persecute his political
foes.55 When Thomas Jefferson5 6 succeeded him, he allowed the
Act to expire, pardoned all those prosecuted by the grand jury
under it, and attempted to force Congress to recompense all
fines.57 Yet, Jefferson himself proved no less vulnerable to the
grand jury's potential for abuse than his predecessor. Jefferson
hounded his political enemy, Aaron Burr, with highly questionable
charges, and vindictively utilized two Kentucky grand juries in an
unsuccessful attempt to eliminate Burr."S However, as bitter
memories from the Revolution faded, so to did the animosity be-
tween the political parties, freeing the grand jury from such direct
manipulation.
As the nation expanded westward, the grand jury began to be
criticized as costly, cumbersome, and unnecessary.59 Beginning
with Michigan's lead in 1859, many states began to restrict the
51. U.S. Const. amend. V; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343
(1974); cf Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1956).
52. A presentment was an accusation arising from personal knowledge of one
or more of the grand jurors, forcing the state to issue formal charges against those
suspected. See Note, The Grand Jury--Its Investigatory Powers and Limitations,
37 Minn. L. Rev. 586, 603 (1953).
53. Power shifted between the Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, and the
Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. See Schwartz, supra
note 13, at 721-24.
54. Alien & Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 590; see also Schwartz,
supra note 13, at 722-23 (act made illegal all criticism of government officials and
policies, a blatant attempt by the Federalists to stifle Republican opposition).
55. The passage of this Act led to the systematic prosecution of some prominent
Republicans. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 723-24.
56. See Wallechinsky & Wallace, supra note 14, at 262.
57. See Charles & Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization 385 (1910).
58. See generally, Schwartz, supra note 13, at 732-38.
59. See LaFave & Israel, supra note 13, § 8.2(b); Coates, supra note 14, at 316
(quoting 2 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 313 (1827).
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power of the grand jury, granting prosecutors the option of pro-
ceeding either by indictment or by information.60 The constitu-
tionality of this shift was subsequently affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court.61 Today, six states require a grand jury
screening in capital offenses only;62 fourteen states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia require the grand jury in all felony cases;63 and
four states insist on grand jury review for all crimes.64 Twenty-
five states now give prosecutors the option of proceeding by either
indictment or information,6 5 and in Pennsylvania the grand jury
lacks authority to indict.66 No state has gone the route of England,
which has abolished the grand jury.67
III. The Historic Function of the Grand Jury
The historic function of the grand jury, commonly referred to
as the shield and the sword, survives to this day.6 8 The grand jury
is likened to a shield in its performance of screening the govern-
ment's evidence against the accused and the prosecutor's decision
to charge the accused with an offense. 69 The analogy to the sword
stems from the investigatory function of the grand jury. Utilizing
its investigatory authority, the grand jury is able to discover evi-
60. See, e.g., Minn. Const. art. I, § 7.
61. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
62. Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Is-
land. Emerson, supra note 34, at 12.
63. Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia. Id.
64. New Jersey, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id.
65. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
66. The grand jury has only investigative powers and cannot issue indictments.
Id.
67. id. at 10. During World War I, the use of grand juries was temporarily
halted in part because they were "carried away by war hysteria, and bringing accu-
sations against persons against whom one exercising calm judgment would find no
ground for suspicion." Charles Burdick, Criminal Justice in America, 11 A.B.A. J.
510, 511 (1925).
68. See Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) ('The grand jury's historic functions
survive to this day. Its responsibilities continue to include both the determination
whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the pro-
tection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions."); see also Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972).
69. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) ("[Tlhis body has been regarded as
a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive persecu-
tion; it serves the invaluable function... of standing between the accuser and the
accused .... "); see also State v. Iosue, 220 Minn. 283, 293, 19 N.W.2d 735, 740 (1945)
("[Tihe most valuable function of the grand jury was not only to examine into the
commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused .... ).
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dence which allows the government to prosecute otherwise unat-
tainable charges. 70 These two roles are most commonly performed
by the same grand jury.
When performing its traditional function, the grand jury pos-
sesses a unique degree of independence. 71 The rationale underly-
ing this independence is to protect the shield function of the
body.72 The authority wielded by the grand jury is not derived
from the government, but rather is a grant from the people
themselves.73
The grand jury does not function as does a formal tribunal
and, as such, is relatively free from procedural restraint.7 4 Since
the grand jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has
been allowed to operate without strict observation of many proce-
dural safeguards applicable at trial.75 Yet, the due process guaran-
tee76 of a fair trial should not be completely ignored. This is true
despite the fact that many of the constitutional principles that are
enforced at trial do not apply to grand jury proceedings. 77 The ex-
traordinary breadth of the grand jury's power has been consist-
ently reinforced by the United States Supreme Court. The grand
jury may act solely on testimony which would be inadmissible at
trial;78 the persons targeted for prosecution and about to be in-
dicted may not refuse to appear and may be forced to testify;
79
these persons have no right even to be informed of their "dilemma
of engaging either in self-incrimination or perjury;"80 the wit-
nesses may not refuse to answer a question on the ground that it is
70. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-87.
71. In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1956).
72. See State v. Falcone, 292 Minn. 365, 367-68, 195 N.W.2d 572, 575 (1972).
This body adopted the procedure of hearing testimony in private,
which proved to be a significant safeguard against the ever-present
abuses by the Crown. It was this common-law tradition of secrecy, ini-
tially stemming from a need to protect the grand jurors and private
citizens from oppression of the state which was the underpinning of
our grand jury procedure as it evolved early in American
jurisprudence.
Id.
73. In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d at 269.
74. See People v. Glen, 173 N.Y. 395, 400-01, 66 N.E. 112, 114 (1903).
75. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974).
76. U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV.
77. State v. Stepney, 181 Conn. 268, 276-77, 435 A.2d 701, 705 (1980), cert denied,
449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
78. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1956) (tax evasion case
presented to the grand jury by means of hearsay testimony by paid informants); see
also United States v. Levine, 700 F.2d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Neff, 525 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941, 943
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 23 (1974).
79. See United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 179 n.8 (1977).
80. Id. at 177-78.
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irrelevant or incompetent;8 ' and they may not argue that the
grand jury is exceeding its authority.8 2 The right to remain si-
lent,8 3 and the right to counsel does not apply inside the grand
jury room.84
Since the grand jury is considered an "arm of the court,"85
one would expect zealous scrutiny of its actions, especially consid-
ering the limited rights of witnesses and potential for abuse.
Courts, however, are reluctant to interfere8 6 and do so only in
cases of flagrant abuse resulting in prejudice.8 7 The rationale be-
hind this relative freedom is, simply put, that to convert grand
jury proceedings into a trial on the merits would be time-consum-
ing, unnecessary and duplicative.8 8 Further, given the choice of
dismissing the indictment or trying an allegedly guilty defendant,
most courts are hesitant to halt the process, especially because the
alternative is charging by complaint.
IV. The Grand Jury in Minnesota
Minnesota law provides that offenses punishable by life im-
prisonment must be prosecuted by indictment.8 9 This is essentially
identical to the federal proposition as stated in the Constitution. 90
Minnesota law mandates that grand jurors be drawn at random
from throughout the county.91 A grand jury consists of not more
than twenty-three members.92 No action can take place before the
grand jury unless at least sixteen members are present.93 Al-
lowing the grand jury to drop below the maximum number accom-
81. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
82. Id.
83. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976).
84. Id.
85. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960).
86. See United States v. Adams, 742 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1984) (prosecutor not ob-
ligated to present exculpatory evidence); United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268 (5th
Cir. 1979) (use of perjured testimony does not mandate automatic dismissal); Lo-
raine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968)
(indictment upheld despite willful suppression of impeachment evidence of key wit-
nesses by prosecutor).
87. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.06, subd. 1 (1988).
88. See State v. Inthavong, 402 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Minn. 1987) ("A grand jury
proceeding is not a trial on the merits .... To insist on the many procedural safe-
guards and evidentiary rules required at trial 'would contort the grand jury pro-
ceedings into a preliminary trial on the merits'." (quoting United States v. Shoeber,
489 F. Supp. 393, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1979))),
89. Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01 (1988).
90. See U.S. Const. amend. V; see also; Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 628
(1972).
91. Minn. Stat. § 628.41, subd. 1 (1988); Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.01, subd. 2 (1988).
92. Minn. Stat. § 628.41, subd. 1 (1988); Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.03, subd. 1 (1988).
93. Minn. Stat. § 628.41, subd. 1 (1988); Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.03, subd. 1 (1988).
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modates the likely need to excuse one or more jurors over the
course of the grand jury term, which can extend for up to one
year.94
The court prepares the grand jury for the proceedings. The
court selects one of the grand jurors to serve as jury foreperson 95
and administers the oath to the panel.96 The court gives an im-
panelling charge to the grand jury, and, as required by law, reads
the grand jury certain statutory provisions.97 The judge then ex-
cuses herself and control of the grand jury is turned over to the
prosecutor for the remainder of its term.98 Challenges to an indi-
vidual juror, or to the panel itself, have been eliminated.99 Any
objections based on these grounds must be brought in a motion to
dismiss the indictment. 0o
The remainder of the grand jury proceedings occurs in secret.
The only persons allowed to be present while the grand jury is in
session, besides the jurors themselves, are the prosecutor, the wit-
ness, and, if necessary, a court reporter and a deputy sheriff.101 A
record of the proceedings is taken only when a witness is before
the grand jury.10 2 This secrecy requirement is relaxed only upon a
showing of good cause, or that grounds for dismissal may exist. 0 3
The prosecutor completely controls the grand jury proceed-
ings. The prosecutor decides what to investigate, whom to ques-
tion, whom to indict, and what to charge.10 4 No judge is present to
oversee the proceedings, nor is a lawyer allowed to represent the
witnesses unless a witness has waived her immunity.'9 5 Plainly,
the grand jury provides a natural opportunity for prosecutorial
94. "A grand jury shall be drawn to serve for a specific period of time, not to
exceed twelve months ...." Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.09 (1988).
95. Minn. Stat. § 628.56 (1988)
96. See Minn. Stat. § 628.56 (1988); Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.03, subd. 3 (1987).
97. See Mirn. Stat. § 628.56 (1988) ('"The grand jury shall then be charged by
the court, who, in doing so, shall read to it the provisions of [specified statutes and
rules of criminal procedure] and may give it such other information as it may deem
proper as to the nature of its duties ...."); Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.03, subd. 3 (1988);
State v. Inthavong, 402 N.W.2d 799, 801 n.2 (Minn. 1987).
98. In Hennepin County, which handles the majority of grand jury cases in
Minnesota, the grand jury room is located in the middle of the County Attorney's
office, and the jurors are summoned by the County Attorney when needed.
99. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.02, subd. 1 (1988) ("Challenges to the grand jury
panel and to individual grand jurors are abolished.").
100. Id. ("Objections to the grand jury panel and to individual grand jurors shall
be made by motion to dismiss the indictment .... ).
101. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.04 (1988); see also Minn. Stat. § 628.63 (1988).
102. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.05, subd. 1 (1988).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 5.




After the grand jury hears the evidence, it then retires to de-
liberate and to determine the case as presented by the state. 0 7
The grand jury may return an indictment "when upon all of the
evidence there is probable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the defendant committed it."108 Such a
bill may be returned "only upon the concurrence of twelve or
more jurors."i 09 When this is the case, the foreperson shall attach
her signature to the bill and deliver it to the judge in open
court."l0 If a majority of the grand jury does not find the requisite
probable cause exists, then the foreperson shall likewise report
this to the judge in open court, and the charges against the accused
will be dismissed."' Such a dismissal does not, however, preclude
the prosecutor from resubmitting the case to another grand jury
upon receiving permission from the court."i2
Minnesota zealously guards the traditional secrecy surround-
ing the grand jury. State law provides that nothing occurring
before the body is to be disclosed to anyone other than the prose-
cutor, except upon court order."i3 Additionally, nothing that is
voiced by the grand jurors during their deliberations or voting is
ever to be disclosed."i 4 Violations of these secrecy requirements
may result in criminal sanctions against the perpetrator."i 5
A grand jury indictment is rarely overturned on review."6
In Minnesota, an indictment may be dismissed either when it is
"not found or returned as required by law,""7 or when it "does
not substantially comply with the requirements prescribed by law
106. United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J.,
dissenting).
107. See Minn. Stat. § 628.57 (1988) ("The grand jury shall then retire").
108. Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.06, subd. 2 (1988).




113. See Minn. Stat. § 628.65 (1988); Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.08 (1988).
114. See Minn. Stat. § 628.66 (1988); Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.08 (1988).
115. See Minn. Stat. § 628.68 (1988).
[Every judge, grand juror, county attorney, court administrator, or
other officer, who .. , shall disclose, before an accused person shall be
in custody, the fact that an indictment found or ordered against the ac-
cused person, and every grand juror who .. .shall willfully disclose
any evidence adduced before the grand jury, or anything which the ju-
ror or any other member of the grand jury said, or in what manner
any grand juror voted upon any matter before them, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor.
Id.
116. See State v. Inthavong, 402 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Minn. 1987).
117. Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.06, subd. 2(1)(e) (1988).
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to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant."118
Technical defects,119 or those which do not prejudice the rights of
the defendant,120 are generally insufficient to force dismissal of
the indictment. Further, an indictment which is valid on its face is
afforded a presumption of regularity,121 and without an adequate
showing of impropriety, will not be dismissed.122
This is not, however, to say that indictments are never over-
turned on review by the appellate courts. In the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision, State v. Inthavong,2 3 an improper im-
panelling charge was found to invalidate a challenged indict-
ment.124 The decision was primarily based on an inaccurate
instruction on probable cause by the trial court, which limits the
precedential effect on the grand jury's independence. In another
Minnesota case, State v. Grose,125 an indictment was dismissed
with prejudice because of a number of statements by the prosecu-
tor. The prosecutor commented on the accused's failure to tes-
tify,126 the accused's failure to waive the statute of limitations, 127
and the unlikelihood that the accused would receive a prison sen-
tence.128 The prosecutor also misstated the law to the grand
jury 29 and did not allow the grand jury to deliberate and vote on
the indictment after it was drafted.130 These cases are significant
in that dismissal was granted only upon egregious errors striking
at bedrock grand jury principles.
V. The Function of the Minnesota Grand Jury Contrasted With the
Grand Jury's Historical Function
The historic function of the grand jury was to function both
as the shield and the sword, alternatively investigating accusations
of wrongdoing and acting as a protector of the citizenry, standing
118. Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.06, subd. 2(2)(a) (1988).
119. See Gasper v. District Court, 264 P.2d 679, 681 (Idaho 1953) ('-Te defect
here is a matter of form which does not tend to prejudice any substantial rights of
the defendant.").
120. Id. at 683.
121. United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S.
944 (1978). ("[A]bsent some evidence of gross purposeful deception by the prosecu-
tor, an indictment legally valid on its face will not be overturned .... ")
122. Id.; see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
123. 402 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 1987).
124. Id. at 803.
125. 387 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
126. Id. at 187.
127. Id. at 187-88.
128. Id. at 188.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 189.
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between the accuser and the accused.'13 The popular perception of
the grand jury focused on the shield aspect, viewing the grand jury
as an independent bulwark protecting the citizens from unfounded
and malicious prosecutions from the state.132
In Minnesota, the reality is that the independence of the
grand jury has been eroded to the degree that it now functions as a
powerful tool of the prosecution.133 The Minnesota grand jury
continuously interacts with the prosecutor, who screens the case
initially, determines the scope of the investigation, and interprets
the law for the members of the grand jury.134 This overt depen-
dence upon the prosecutor leaves the grand jury vulnerable to ma-
nipulation and abuse, and raises serious questions about the loss of
its traditional independence and the underlying control of the
prosecutor.
As the role of the grand jury in Minnesota has evolved, it has
deviated from its historical function. The history of the Minnesota
grand jury reveals a system that frequently has failed to fulfill its
perceived function of protecting innocent persons from vindictive
prosecutions by the state.13w Worse yet, it has become transformed
into a powerful weapon in the hands of the prosecution. 38
VI. Analysis
The grand jury's deviation from its traditional role as the
watchdog of the citizenry has drawn not only harsh criticism and
cries for reform, but even calls for the abolition of the institu-
tion.137 This condemnation has centered on the abdication of the
grand jury's historically independent role and the resultant depen-
dence on the prosecutor. This shift leaves the grand jury ex-
tremely vulnerable to prosecutorial abuse and manipulation. This
day-to-day dependence on the prosecutor has been noted by every-
one from Judge Learned Hand, who penned "[s]ave for torture, it
would be hard to find a more effective tool of tyranny than the
131. See supra note 68.
132. See State v. Grose, 387 N.W.2d 182, 186 (Minn. 1986); State v. Iosue, 220
Minn. 283, 292-93, 19 N.W.2d 735, 740 (1945).
133. See Note, The Grand Jury-Its Investigatory Powers and Limitations, 37
Minn. L. Rev. 586, 600 (1953).
134. The county attorney has a statutory duty to advise the grand jury on the
applicable law. Minn. Stat. § 388.051, subd. l(d) (1988).
135. See generally Clark, supra note 13, at 104.
136. See generally id.
137. Kranitz, supra note 21, at 328. "As an inquisitorial body generally... the
grand jury is a relic which should take its place on the dusty shelves of legal his-
tory, beside other ancient common law practices." Id.
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power of unlimited and unchecked ex-parte examination,"'138 to an
anonymous assistant county attorney who stated that he could get
a grand jury to "indict a hamburger."'139 The means by which this
dependence can be manipulated are many: impugning the charac-
ter of the defendant, 140 conveying opinions about the evidence,141
threatening' 42 or harassing143 the witness, failing to advise a wit-
ness of his rights,144 discrediting a witness' reliance on those
rights, 45 or simply interpreting the law for the grand jury in a bi-
ased manner.146
Yet, some of this dependence is to be expected. The prosecu-
tor stays with the grand jury at all times except during delibera-
tions and voting.' 47 Throughout the grand jury term, the various
grand jurors may form some degree of a personal relationship with
the prosecutor. 48 Further, the lack of any formal legal education
on the part of the grand jurors inevitably operates to increase their
reliance on the knowledge of the prosecutor.149 Thus, the very
structure of the grand jury process encourages a degree of depen-
dency on the prosecutor.
Yet, this dependence has increased over time, to the degree
that the traditional independence of the grand jury may be endan-
gered.o5 0 Three underlying reasons have been put forth for the ab-
rogation: the failure to record all of the proceedings before the
138. United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J., dis-
senting), cert denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954).
139. Informal conversation with a member of the Hennepin County Attorney's
Office (Mar. 8, 1988). '"oday, the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor
who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost
anything, before any grand jury." Campbell, supra note 19, at 174.
140. See United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutors
interrogation of accused was designed to prejudice grand jury).
141. See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623-24 (2d Cir. 1979); see also
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-3.5(a) (1982).
142. See United States v. Roberts, 481 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1963).
143. See, e.g., United States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1189 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979); United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 571-73 (2d Cir.
1953) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954).
144. See United States v. Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), vacated, 429 U.S. 909, re-
manded, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976).
145. See United States v. Digrazia, 213 F. Supp 232 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
146. This reflects a conflict inherent in the dual role forced upon the prosecutor
appearing before the grand jury, since she is not only attempting to secure an in-
dictment, but also acting as a minister of justice and not merely as an advocate. See
Minn. R. Prof. Cond. 3.8 comment.
147. Minn. Stat. § 623.63 (1988).
148. Informal conversation with -a member of the Hennepin County Attorney's
Office (Mar. 8, 1988).
149. Id.
150. See Note, Failure to Record Proceedings: Antoher Gap in the Glory of the
Grand Jury, 27 U. Fla. L. Rev. 817, 818 (1975).
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grand jury, the difficulty in obtaining a record of the grand jury
proceedings, and the reluctance of the judiciary to adequately su-
pervise and correct any errors or misconduct involving the grand
jury.
A. Failure to Record
The first point for criticism is the failure to record the entire
proceedings before the grand jury. In Minnesota, the only part of
the proceedings which must be recorded is that which takes place
when a witness is before the body.151 This means that a relatively
large portion of the action before the grand jury is conducted in a
way that precludes meaningful review. 5 2 This renders moot sev-
eral grounds for challenging an indictment and hinders the ability
of a defendant to prepare adequately for trial.
Failure to record the entire proceedings before the grand jury
arguably violates due process153 and is also illogical. A defendant's
ability to challenge prosecutorial abuses is largely contingent on a
record upon which to base these challenges. 154 Such a record
would also eliminate speculative challenges, giving the prosecution
documentation of its conduct occurring before the grand jury. To-
day, the federal rules and many states require recordation of the
entire proceedings, except for deliberations and voting. 5 5 Since
recording the testimony of witnesses has always been viewed as
desirable, 56 no sound reason exists why the rest of the process
should not be recorded. A working example of such a recordation
procedure is already in place in two judicial districts157 and has yet
to lend any credence to the fears that such recommendations often
arouse.1 5 8 Other jurisdictions would also be likely to find such a
151. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.05, subd. 1 (1988).
152. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.06 (1988); Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.02, subd. 2 (1988).
153. See Note, supra note 151, at 837.
154. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on the Prosecutorial Function §§ 3-
3.5 commentary ("It is particularly desirable that a record be made of the prosecu-
tor's communications and presentations to the jury"); National Prosecution Stan-
dards § 14.2 (National District Attorneys Ass'n § 14.2(f) (1977) ("All testimony
before the grand jury should be recorded").
155. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(E) (1988). For a discussion of States' recording
policies, see Note, supra note 151, at 830-37.
156. See United States v. Peden, 472 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1973).
157. The First and Fourth Judicial Districts require recordation of all grand jury
proceedings, except voting and deliberations. State v. Whitney, No. 87-1609 (Minn.
4th Dist. Feb. 2, 1988).
158. Examples of those fears include exposing the grand jury witnesses to undue
influence or threats, groundless threats and transforming the proceedings into a
mini-trial on the merits.
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procedure acceptable. Further, such disclosure would ensure
every accused full protection of his due process rights.
B. Discovery of Grand Jury Records
Proceedings before the grand jury have traditionally been
cloaked in secrecy.' 5 9 The reasons for this secrecy were enuner-
ated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Proc-
tor & Gamble Co. :160
(1) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand
jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to in-
dictment or their friends from importuning grand jurors; (3) to
prevent subornation or perjury or tampering with witnesses
who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the
trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untram-
meled disclosures by persons who have information with re-
spect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect an innocent
accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he
has been under investigation, and from the expense of stand-
ing trial where there was no probability of guilt.161
These reasons ring hollow, since they are meaningless once
the grand jury's investigation has been completed.162 The accused
is or should be, if necessary, in custody well before any disclosure
of the grand jury proceedings is made. The fear that the grand ju-
rors or witnesses who have testified before the body will be sub-
jected to coercion is likewise without merit: the grand jury does
not concern itself with a case once it has returned an indictment,
and the witnesses are no more susceptible to improper influence
than they would be in a case proceeding by complaint. Further,
any innocent person would be best served by full disclosure to
demonstrate that the indictment is groundless.163 The secrecy sur-
rounding the grand jury has been ironically twisted to the degree
that it now serves the very purpose it sought to guard against.
In addition to enhancing discovery, full diclosure serves other
valuable functions, such as measuring the prosecutor's actions
159. See generally Richard Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1
John Marshall J. Prac. & Pro. 18 (1967).
160. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
161. Id. at 681 n.76 (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir.
1954)).
162. See 8 John Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2362 (John Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961) ("There remains, therefore, on principle, no cases at all in
which after the grand jury's functions are ended, the privilege of the witnesses not
to have their testimony disclosed should be deemed to continue.").
163. See Pittsburgh Plate & Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
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against the applicable constitutional principles.164 Full disclosure
is also very important to the court's analysis of the sufficiency of
the indictment,165 a condition precedent to bringing a defendant to
trial,166 since errors and improprieties occurring in this non-adver-
sarial procedure can be effectively illuminated only by the trained
eye of defense counsel.167
Yet, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure sharply
limit disclosure of grand jury records. Under the Rules, the court
grants disclosure only upon motion, subject to whatever protective
order is deemed necessary. 168
C. Supervision by the Judiciary
The single most important factor in the transformation of the
grand jury into the alter-ego of the prosecutor169 is the consistent
failure of the judiciary to provide meaningful supervision. The few
strict rules governing grand jury proceedings are rendered mean-
ingless by the failure of the courts to enforce them 70 and thus
provide a deterrent to similar misconduct in the future.17 ' This
creates a virtual Garden of Eden for prosecutorial manipulation,
since prosecutors who are so inclined can rest assured that any im-
proprieties will go unpunished.172 This creates a vacuum inevita-
164. See Note, supra note 150, at 823 ("Recorded grand jury testimony readily
facilitates court supervision of procedures used by both the prosecutor and the
grand jury.").
165. Id. at 822.
166. Note, Indictment Svfficiency, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 876 (1970).
167. "[Ihe nonadversary nature of the procedure often denies the judge the im-
portant balancing view, both legal and factual, ordinarily provided by defense coun-
sel." Note, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, The Trial Judge, And Undue
Influence, 39 Chi. L. Rev. 761, 767 (1972).
168. See Minn. R. Crirn. P. 18.05, subd. 2 (1988).
169. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 178-79.
170. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (1988) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 83 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("Denying defendants relief for clear violations of their procedural
rights reduces the law to 'pretend rules'....").
171. "The extreme sanction of dismissal of an indictment is justified... to 'help
to translate the assurances of the United States Attorneys into consistent perform-
ances by their assistants'." United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 1978)
(quoting United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1979)), cert denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); see also United
States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 84 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Respect for the rule of law demands that improperly procured indict-
ments be quashed even after conviction, because only by upsetting
convictions so obtained can the ardor of prosecuting officials be kept
within legal bounds and justice be secured; for in modern times all
prosecution is in the hands of officials.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440, 586 P.2d 916, 921
(1978).
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bly filled by the prosecutor, the only person who deals with the
grand jury on a regular basis.
Despite the fact that the grand jury is a quasi-independent
body, it remains an arm of the court and is subject to judicial re-
view. Scrutiny of the prosecutor's actions occurs under two sepa-
rate doctrines: a court may dismiss an indictment on the basis of
the due process clause,173 where the focus is on the fairness to the
defendant and rectifying the prejudice to his rights,174 or on the
court's inherent supervisory power,175 which is premised on deter-
ring prosecutorial misconduct 176 and protecting the integrity of the
judicial system.177
Yet, the courts have been extremely reluctant to impose the
"extreme sanction" of dismissal,178 instead applying a more restric-
tive standard. They operate as if prosecutorial misconduct, by it-
self, is insufficient to warrant dismissal of an indictment.179
Rather, the misconduct must rise to such a level that it infringes
on the ability of the grand jury to exercise independent judg-
ment. 80 Further, the burden is on the defendent to establish this
prejudice.181
The United States Supreme Court has acted recently to
greatly limit the availability of judicial relief. In United States v.
Mechanik,182 the court held that a subsequent guilty verdict issued
by a petit jury rendered any errors in the grand jury proceeding
harmless. 8 3 This in effect means that any challenges to the indict-
173. See United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523, 530 (10th Cir. 1983).
174. Id. at 530-31; see also United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.
1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985).
175. Pino, 708 F.2d at 530; see also United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456,
1465 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987), ,ff'd sub. nom. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108
S. Ct. 2369 (1988).
176. "Under its inherent supervisory powers,... dismissal is used as a prophy-
lactic tool for discouraging future deliberate governmental impropriety of a similar
nature." United States v. Owens, 580 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1978).
177. See McClintock, 748 F.2d at 1285 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727, 735 n.8 (1980)).
178. See Owens, 580 F.2d at 367 ("However, these supervisory powers remain a
harsh, ultimate sanction (which) are more often referred to than invoked.").
179. See United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d at 1465.
180. United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523, 530 (10th Cir. 1983).
181. State v. Inthavong, 402 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 1987).
182. 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
183. Id. at 702.
[Tihe petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict not only means that there
was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as
charged, but that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reason-
able doubt. Measured by the petit jury's verdict, then, any error in the
grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.
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ment must occur prior to trial,184 otherwise they will be rendered
moot. The defendant will either be acquitted or found guilty, in
which case any improprieties in the grand jury's decision will be
deemed harmless. 8 5
Further, in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,8 6 the court
held that in cases of non-constitutional error, a harmless error
standard would be applied.187 Bank of Nova Scotia was a consoli-
dated appeal, in which the underlying cases presented a veritable
"laundry list" of prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, in order to pre-
vail in a grand jury challenge based upon prosecutorial miscon-
duct, a defendant must show that any errors that occurred
prejudiced his hearing. The court was careful to limit this holding
only to cases where the error did not infringe upon the indepen-
dence of the grand jury's decision to indictl88 or where the miscon-
duct was not systematic and pervasive, spanning several cases. 8 9
All of this results in an extremely difficult trial for a defend-
ant seeking dismissal of an indictment, placing the burden of
showing prejudice on the defendant. Not only does this encourage
prosecutorial manipulation of the grand jury, but also, in time,
gives this conduct an illusion of legitimacy. Today's harmless error
becomes tomorrow's standard of conduct. This operates to further
infringe upon the traditional independence, since circumstances
which in the past clearly would have warranted dismissal are now
seen as lawful conduct.i 90
it is time to reverse this trend and restore the grand jury to
its traditional independent role. The courts must strictly enforce
184. Perhaps in response to the dilemma posed by the Mechanik ruling, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, in State v. Scruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 717 (Minn. 1988), noted
in dicta that the proper method for challenging an indictment was a pre-trial mo-
tion for dismissal, thus implicitly providing an avenue for judicial review in spite of
Mechanik.
185. The Courts focus on the effect of the verdict, in combination with its
per se rule, gives judges and prosecutors a powerful incentive to delay
consideration of motions to dismiss based on an alleged defect in the
indictment until the jury has spoken. If the jury convicts, the motion
is denied; if the jury acquits, the matter is mooted.
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 77 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988).
187. "Having concluded that our customary harmless error inquiry is applicable
where, as in the cases before us, a court is asked to dismiss an indictment prior to
the conclusion of the trial .... " Id. at 2374.
188. Id. at 2376 ("In the cases before us we do not inquire whether the grand
jury's independence was infringed.").
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., State v. Ernster, 147 Minn. 81, 85, 179 N.W. 640, 642 (1920) ("If
those interested in prosecuting may send a delegation to the grand jury to induce
the finding of a bill, so may the criminal send his delegation and lawyer to persuade
that no bill be found.").
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the few clear rules governing grand jury practice. Although sub-
stantial social costs are often involved in dismissing indictments,191
insuring the integrity of the judicial system is far more impor-
tant.192 Moreover, after illustrating the serious consequences of
failure to comply with the few firm rules governing grand jury
proceedings, prosecutorial compliance with such standards would
quickly follow. 193
VII. Conclusion
The Minnesota grand jury has abrogated its historical inde-
pendence to the prosecution. The historical function of the grand
jury, to act as the shield of the citizenry from oppressive and ill-
founded prosecutions has been grossly distorted. Today, the grand
jury functions solely as an investigatory body that is dominated by
the guiding hand of the prosecutor. This is a violation of the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine, upon which the very framework of our
government rests. The grand jury is no longer a group of layper-
sons gathered to protect the citizenry from a malicious govern-
ment; instead, it has become a prosecutorial rubber stamp.
Obviously, the grand jury cannot be expected to function ef-
fectively in the modern legal process in the same manner that it
did centuries ago. Yet, the traditional independence of the grand
jury must not be totally extinguished. Abolition of the grand jury
is not the answer; not only would this set a dangerous precedent
for amending the Bill of Rights, but, as evidenced by its prominent
role in the Watergate investigations, also would remove an effec-
tive and trusted means of investigation. However, to sit idly by
191. The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces
jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to ex-
pend futher time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has
already once taken place; victims may be asked to relive their dis-
turbing experiences .... Thus, while reversal may, in theory, entitle
the defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused
with complete freedom from prosecution, and thereby cost society the
right to punish admitted offenders.
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1985); see also United States v. Serubo,
604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979).
192. "But the costs of continued unchecked prosecutorial misconduct are also
substantial. This is particularly so before the grand jury . Serubo, 604 F.2d at
817.
193. "The only way to allow even minimally effective enforcement of those rules
is to reverse the convictions of defendants whose indictments were tainted ....
Such an approach would not hamper enforcement of the criminal law." Mechanik,
475 U.S. 83-84; see also United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 574 (2d Cir. 1953)
(Hand, J., dissenting) ("[Qinly by upsetting convictions so obtained can the ardor of
prosecuting officials be kept within legal bounds and justice be secured .... ), cet
denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954).
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and allow such a gross perversion does not speak well of our sys-
tem of justice. The greatest hope lies instead in legislative action
incorporating several means of reform.194 Statutory requirements
of full recordation and disclosure of grand jury proceedings, along
with increased judicial supervision and willingness to dismiss
tainted indictments would go a long way toward the goal of restor-
ing the independence of the grand jury.
In our legal system, the rights of the individual must be con-
tinually balanced against the interests of the state. The grand jury
is one of the most effective tools in maintaining this balance, and
must be restored to its traditional independent role. Our system of
jurisprudence demands no less.
194. See, e.g., American Bar Association Model Grand Jury Act (Jan. 1982) &
ABA, American Bar Association Policy on the Grand Jury (Aug. 9, 1977), both re-
printed in Deborah Emerson, Grand Jury Reform: A Review of Key Issues, 1983
Nat'l Inst. of Just. app. A at 111, app. B at 119 (proposed reforms and model act).
